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COMMENT
Frontier Feudalism: Agrarian Populism Meets Future
Interest Arcana in the Land of Manifest Destiny
The Cole Porter classic, “Don’t Fence Me In,” asks the heavens (or
maybe the state) for unrestricted “land, lots of land under starry skies
above.”1 A full-throated acclamation of “frontier living,” Porter’s tune also
evokes the boundless potential of achievement and ownership so ensconced
in American mythology. Echoing since the clamor of “Manifest Destiny,” 2
the urge to expand remains a persistent national theme. It also finds
actualization at the state level; indeed, Oklahoma exemplifies such an urge,
its archetypal “Boomers and Sooners” 3 the human embodiments of an
unquenchable desire to set one’s stake in the land.
But such quixotic imagery must find its realization in the framework of
the law—the law of property, to be specific. Hardly a rugged, rough-hewn
creation of the commoner, America’s property law remains a distillation of
feudal English concepts and doctrines. 4 And the scheme is hardly stable.
While it persists, in part or in whole, across the United States, it has
weathered virtually unflagging broadsides for decades. 5 The effects are
1. Bing Crosby & the Andrews Sisters, Don’t Fence Me In, on BING CROSBY, THE
DEFINITIVE COLLECTION (Geffen Records 2006). Cole Porter wrote the song in 1934, and the
song was made famous by Bing Crosby and the Andrew Sisters ten years later. See Don’t
Fence Me In, TCM (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.tcm.com/this-month/article/161339%7C0/
Don-t-Fence-Me-In.html. The opening stanza is:
Oh, give me land, lots of land under starry skies above
Don’t fence me in!
Let me ride through the wide-open country that I love
Don’t fence me in!
Let me be by myself in the evening breeze,
And listen to the murmur of the cottonwood trees;
Send me off forever, but I ask you please
Don’t fence me in!
2. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY : JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 562,
562 n.38 (2005) (noting that Manifest Destiny was viewed as “essentially democratic—not
simply in the old Jeffersonian tradition of enlarging the empire of liberty, but in a
supercharged moral sense, stressing America’s duties to spread democratic values and
institutions”).
3. See W. DAVID BAIRD & DANNEY GOBLE, OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 141–48 (2008).
4. See ROBERT LAURENCE ET AL., A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS vii (LexisNexis, 3d ed. 2012).
5. For just a sampling of such criticism, see 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (overhauling the
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mixed: while regular criticism may keep law in tune with prevalent societal
policy, property law increasingly looks like something mangled by a
flailing cleaver rather than an even-handed scalpel. 6 Classifications and
rules are stricken wholesale, with little analysis or discussion beyond a rote
recitation of shibboleths like “grantor’s intent,” “simplicity,” “efficiency,”
and “alienation.”7 When filtered through plodding legislative reform, these
policy proposals may end up translated into an incoherent patchwork of
medieval detritus, hardly the goal of comprehensive model laws and
treatises. 8

common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and replacing it with a “wait-and-see” approach that
applies equally to contingent and vested remainders); 1 JOHN. A. BORRON, JR., SIMES AND
SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (3d ed. 2002) (detailing the demise, induced by
courts or legislatures, of future interests doctrines like the Rule in Shelley’s Case, the
Doctrine of Worthier Title, and the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders);
D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3 (2009) (proposing a model property law that eliminates feudal future interest
doctrines and streamlines future and present interests); J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Contingent
Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13
(1958) (calling for the elimination of allegedly illusory distinctions between contingent
remainders and executory interests); T. P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513 (2003) (offering policy recommendations that radically simplify
the Anglo-American future interest regime); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the
Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729, 729–35
(1972) (naming deficiencies of the common-law property system and proposing reforms in
the pursuit of greater simplicity and clarity).
6. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. (AM. LAW. INST. 1940) (detailing feudal-era
future interest classifications and doctrines, while offering assessments of where American
statutes stood vis-à-vis these topics), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (offering wholesale reforms of future
interest doctrines and vast changes to classificatory schemes, despite the failure of states to
recognize some or all of these proposed reforms).
7. See, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 25.5 (“The Rule of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders is not recognized as part of
American law.”); see also Katheleen Guzman, Response: Worthier for Whom?, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 779 (2016) (noting frustration with the Restatement (Third)’s terse dismissal of future
interest doctrines like the Doctrine of Worthier Title).
8. For instance, some jurisdictions may retain one future interest doctrine such as the
Rule in Shelley’s Case, while abrogating another, such as the Doctrine of Worthier Title.
Oklahoma, for example, has abrogated the Rule in Shelley’s Case by statute, 60 OKLA. STAT.
§ 41 (2011), while the fate of the Doctrine of Worthier Title is less clear. See Guzman, supra
note 7, at 801 (noting that the doctrine has been applied in numerous Oklahoma cases).
Compare this situation with, for instance, Barros’s comprehensive model law for present
estates and future interests. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67–72.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/5

2018]

COMMENT

945

This Comment aims to reevaluate facets of our property law, with a
particular focus on future interests and the feudal-era doctrines that operate
alongside them. Two major points frame the discussion. First, this
Comment focuses on the law of Oklahoma, both in the spirit of the adage,
“land law is local,”9 and in light of the state’s unique land history.
Oklahoma is fertile ground for a reevaluation of feudal-era concepts,
offering a burst of fresh air for seemingly stagnant and stale ideas. 10
Second, the arguments below are as much procedural as they are
substantive. That is, the following conclusions, while important, are not
offered as definitive; rather, the goal is to challenge legal scholarship’s
hasty (and at times stubborn) abandonment of legal rules that have endured
for generations. 11 Perhaps forces like the Restatement (Third) will emerge
triumphant in the battle of ideas, but the battle ought to be fought
regardless.
Part I of this Comment briefly examines Oklahoma’s future interest law
in light of the broad criticisms leveled against the Anglo-American system,
with a close examination of the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent
remainders (hereinafter, “the destructibility doctrine”).12 Part II—the bulk
of this Comment—delves deeply into recent scholarship and recommended
property reforms. While interesting suggestions arise, the reforms overall
divest the grantor of control of her property—ironic, given that the purpose
9. 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1 (3d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Sept. 2016) (“Land, having a fixed location, is controlled in all
respects . . . by the law of the place where it is located.”).
10. Perhaps new wineskins for old wine (or something like that), to flip the old parable
on its head.
11. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 780, 801 (agreeing with the contention that suggestions
made by authorities such as the Restatement should never be blindly accepted).
12. By way of prologue, this Comment concentrates heavily on the destructibility
doctrine for a reason. Much of modern property law and debate centers around the primacy
of the grantor’s intent—deeds should be construed in accordance with such intent, even
where that intent might seem incongruous with prevailing social policy. See 2 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST.
2011) (“If, on the basis of the evidence, the donor’s intention is found to prefer a result that
is inconsistent with public policy, the donor’s intention controls the meaning, though not
necessarily the effect, of the donative document.”). Here, this Comment argues that
abrogating the destructibility doctrine, often in the name of grantor’s intent, actually does a
disservice to that intent by divesting the grantor of power over her land, such as the power to
alienate it in accord with her wishes. See infra Part II. Hence, while the observations in this
Comment are salient for other future interests doctrines and classificatory areas of commonlaw property, much of the argument is couched in an analysis of the destructibility doctrine
and critiques of scholars who call for its abrogation.
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of the reforms is more often than not to promote alienability and effectuate
the grantor’s intent. Part III returns to Oklahoma—this time an historical
Oklahoma of the 1880s–1910s—looking for political and ideological
undercurrents from which to cull new policy rationales that might salvage
feudal-era property concepts now under siege. When conceptualized
through a non-feudal lens, these time-tested property concepts may indeed
strengthen grantor rights and promote alienability. That is, even if
alienability and grantor’s intent are significant—and correct—policies
contextualizing and inspiring American property law, efforts at efficiency,
simplification, and radical reform may not actually advance these
underlying policy goals;13 instead, reframing old ideas, rather than
abrogating them, may better effectuate these policies. Oklahoma, with its
unique land history and sociopolitical viewpoints, offers an alternative to
hastily discarding pillars of property law that have persisted for centuries.
While medieval England may no longer justify some of these principles,
America’s heartland just may.14
I. What’s Up with Future Interest Doctrine in Oklahoma?
The Anglo-American system of property law, largely derived from
feudal-era England, has weathered sustained criticism for decades. 15
Scholars have aimed at one area in particular—future interest classifications
and doctrines. 16 An outgrowth of the “bundle of sticks” idea at the heart of
property law,17 temporal division of property is a fundamental facet of the
Anglo-American understanding of property.18 But with the benefits of
multigenerational property arrangements come broader concerns tied to
concepts of land alienability and marketability, the importance of the

13. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 795 (“[I]n the centuries since assorted earlier vesting
(thus transfer-supporting) future interest rules have arisen, Anglo-American jurisprudence
has demonstrated but slight concern for their furtherance, especially when to do so would
arguably contravene grantor’s intent. In other words, efficiency is not enough.”).
14. To be sure, in many ways this Comment accepts the importance of alienability and
effectuating the grantor’s intent as two major policies undergirding property law. The
suggestion, however, is that abrogation often fails to achieve the goal of strengthening these
twin justifications.
15. See supra note 5.
16. Id.
17. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY : CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (9th ed. 2008);
see also LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
18. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 514–15 (noting that “temporal division of ownership . . . is
at the heart of modern property transactions”).
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grantor’s intent, and the critical balance between the “reign of the dead
hand” and the authority of the original landowner. 19
In particular, scholars have repeatedly questioned the classificatory
scheme for future interests,20 along with four specific doctrines that police
these interests: the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 the Doctrine of Worthier
Title,22 the Rule in Shelley’s Case,23 and the destructibility doctrine. 24
Frequently, “grantor’s intent” and “alienability of land” appear as the major
animating forces behind these attacks, with “efficiency” and “simplicity”
often tagging along. 25

19. These themes—alienability and grantor’s intent—appear frequently in discussions of
property law and policy. Sometimes they antagonize each other, while at other times they
exist in harmony. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFER §11.3 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting the primacy of donative intent while
also acknowledging that, in cases of ambiguity, the donor is presumed to have favored
public policy’s preference for land alienability); BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193 (noting
that the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders “obviously defeats the intent
of the grantor” and may only be justified because it increases land alienability, albeit
haphazardly).
20. See Barros, supra note 5; Dukeminier, supra note 5; Waggoner, supra note 5.
21. The classic formulation of the rule is as follows: “No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, no later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.” JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray ed.,
4th ed. 1942).
22. The Doctrine of Worthier Title, put simply, is the law against remainders in the heirs
of a grantor. BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 1601.
23. The Rule in Shelley’s Case is the inverse of the Doctrine of Worthier Title, acting to
prevent remainders in a grantee’s heirs. Id. § 1541.
24. “A contingent remainder is destroyed unless it vests at or before the expiration of the
preceding estate.” LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 43. The rule derives from the feudal
concept of “seisin,” a hazy concept typically described as reified possession. See 1 TIFFANY,
supra note 9, §§ 20, 22, 326. Feudal law demanded that the seisin not be in abeyance—
effectively, that the land not be unoccupied. Id. § 326. If the livery of seisin (the physical
actualization of seisin) could not be transferred to the remainderman upon the expiration of
the supporting present estate—because, for example, the remainderman had yet to satisfy the
contingency of his remainder—the estate would return to the original grantor, who held a
reversion. Id. This situation also stemmed from the fact that contingent remainders, at
common law, were viewed as “mere possibilities of estates, less concrete than present estates
or even vested remainders.” See id. The doctrine has come under fire for its roots in these
feudal concepts. See, e.g., Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 280–81 (N.M.
1979) (noting that the doctrine “has been renounced by virtually all jurisdictions in the
United States” and that it often frustrates grantor’s intent in the name of historical
justifications).
25. See Barros, supra note 5; Gallanis, supra note 5; Waggoner, supra note 5.
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The Restatement (Third) offers a telling representation of where reform
efforts presently stand. The Restatement (Third) jettisons the finer
distinctions between future interests, instead offering two discrete
categories: vested and contingent remainders.26 It exchanges the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities for a “wait-and-see” approach, voiding
interests that fail to vest or terminate in a specific timeframe. 27 And it
wholly abrogates all of the feudal future interest doctrines listed above,
insinuating that they have no place in American law. 28 More broadly, the
Restatement (Third) also declares the preeminence of grantor’s intent,
coupled with a societal preference for alienability. 29 Together, these twin
policy pillars hem in deed construction, such that the grantor’s will tends to
prevail—and where the grantor’s will is vague, he or she is presumed to
have favored maximum alienability of the land. 30
State laws, such as those of Oklahoma, fit within this prescriptive
framework. In some ways, Oklahoma occupies a middle ground between
holding fast to the old common law and allowing itself to be swept up in
reformist fervor. Examples of this ideological middle ground can be found
throughout both its statutes and common law. First, Oklahoma has
statutorily abrogated the Rule in Shelley’s Case, following both the trend
among states and the recommendation of the Restatement (Third).31 Second,
while Oklahoma has enacted statutory reform to the Rule Against
Perpetuities for trusts,32 the classic Rule itself remains largely intact—likely
due in no small part to its constitutional enshrinement. 33 In the common-law
realm, a more nuanced scheme of future interests still operates, recognizing
executory interests as well as various contingent and vested remainders.34
26. See 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§
25.1–25.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
27. See id. §§ 27.1–27.3. This contrasts with the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities,
where particular future interests are void ab initio. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 99–
107.
28. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§
16.2–16.3, 25.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
29. See id. §§ 11.2–11.3.
30. Id.
31. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 41 (2011); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 16.2 (noting that the clear majority of states have abolished
the Rule in Shelley’s Case).
32. See 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.47(C) (Supp. 2015).
33. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32 (“Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of
a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or
entailments ever be in force in this State.”).
34. See, e.g., 60 OKLA. STAT. §§ 29–30, 35 (2011).
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But here is where matters get murkier. For instance, the fate of the
Doctrine of Worthier Title is not altogether clear.35 More uncertain still is
the fate of the destructibility doctrine. While two cases are often cited 36 for
the proposition that Oklahoma has abrogated the destructibility doctrine—
Whitten v. Whitten37 and Beatty v. Miley38—these cases represent at most a
weak repudiation of a doctrine operating in the wings of state law.
Moreover, they demonstrate that failing to recognize the rule does not
always further the legal academy’s purported goals of increasing
alienability and, more significantly, honoring the grantor’s intent.
Whitten is typically cited as the first case purportedly abrogating the
destructibility doctrine.39 In Whitten, the grantor, Julia A. Morris, granted
life estates to her son and daughter—Calvin Lee Clifford Morris and
Francis Elizabeth Whitten—by two separate warranty deeds executed in
1934.40 The life estates were followed by a remainder in the heirs of the
body of each grantee. 41 In 1948, Ms. Morris executed two quitclaim deeds
purporting to transfer her reversion in each parcel to her children, such that
they would now hold an estate in fee simple absolute rather than merely a
life estate.42 The conveyances, then, look like this:

35. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 801 (suggesting that while Oklahoma has applied the
Doctrine in case law, it has not had an adequate opportunity to determine whether the
Doctrine truly persists in Oklahoma); see also Beamer v. Ashby, 1951 OK 111, ¶ 8, 231
P.3d 668, 669 (“[The court] ha[s] not had occasion to adopt or reject the ‘worthier title’
doctrine, and it is not necessary to do so in this case.”).
36. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 209 n.7 (citing Whitten v. Whitten and Beatty v.
Miley for the proposition that Oklahoma has eliminated the destructibility doctrine).
37. 1950 OK 93, 219 P.2d 228.
38 . 1951 OK 184, 233 P.2d 269.
39. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 209 n.7.
40. Whitten, ¶ 2, 219 P.2d at 230.
41. Id. The Rule in Shelley’s Case had been abrogated by statute at this point. See 60
OKLA. STAT. § 41 (2011) (“When a remainder is limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of
a person to whom a life estate in the same property is given, the persons who, on the
termination of the life estate, are the successors or heirs of the body of the owner for life, are
entitled to take by virtue of the remainder so limited to them, and not as mere successors of
the owner for life.”).
42. Whitten, ¶ 3, 219 P.2d at 230. It is somewhat unclear from the case opinion whether
Ms. Morris meant to give her reversions in all parcels solely to her daughter. The opinion
quotes language from each quitclaim deed—but the language pertains only to Ms. Morris
conveying over her reversion to Francis Whitten, not Calvin Morris. More likely, the court
simply quoted one of the quitclaim deeds to illustrate the conveyance, implying that the
other quitclaim deed included the same language, but to Calvin Morris.
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1934: OA for life, remainder in A’s heirs of the body43
1948: OA and her heirs
Under the destructibility doctrine, the second deeds would have given
Ms. Morris’s children a fee simple absolute by way of merger. 44 That is,
each child held a life estate prior to the 1948 deeds, which conveyed Ms.
Morris’s reversion to the children. Thus, the life estate and reversion would
merge, destroying the contingent remainder in each child’s bodily heirs and
resulting in each child holding a fee simple absolute.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, chose a different route. While
the Court rejected the argument that the remainders were vested in the
children of Elizabeth Whitten and Calvin Morris—given that an
individual’s “heirs” cannot be ascertained until his or her death, 45 the
remainders were contingent—it held that Ms. Morris’s reversion, rather
than the remainders, was the subordinate future interest in the
conveyances. 46
Whitten represents Oklahoma’s first crack in the common-law
destructibility doctrine. Under the common-law rule, all contingent
43. In the event that no bodily heir of A exists, the property would revert back to O. Thus,
O holds a reversion.
44. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 197.
45. Whitten, ¶¶ 11–13, 219 P.2d at 231–32.
46. Specifically, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]t does not follow . . . that because the fee title, except to the extent of the life
estate, remained vested in the grantor that the latter's deed to the life tenant
conveyed an indefeasible fee, thus defeating the contingent remainder. Since
the effect of the [1934] conveyance was to create a contingent remainder in the
entire fee, the only alienable or assignable estate remaining in the grantor was
that of reversion which was subordinate to the contingent remainder because
its enjoyment is dependent upon the failure of the event upon the occurrence of
which the remainder was to vest. . . . Under the circumstances, the deeds of
March 9, 1948, were ineffective to disturb the existence of the remainders
theretofore created and therefore could not enlarge into a fee the life estates
then enjoyed by the grantees. The only effect of such deeds was to carry to the
grantees the reversion theretofore vested in the grantor.
Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 219 P.2d at 232 (emphasis added). For support, the Court cites language from a
Virginia case:
“Upon a grant or devise of a particular estate limited to determine upon the
happening of an event which is certain to happen, with a contingent remainder
over, there remains in the grantor or devisor a reversion, subject to be defeated
by the happening of the contingency upon which the remainder is conditioned.”
Id. ¶ 14, 219 P.2d at 232 (quoting Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 S.E. 802, 813 (Va. 1930)
(emphasis added)).
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remainders require the support of a freehold estate. 47 Once this freehold
estate terminates (whether by natural expiration or by merger with another
interest), the unvested remainder, suddenly exposed and unsupported, is
destroyed. 48 In Whitten, however, the dynamic flipped. Whereas at common
law, the remainder in the children’s heirs would have been destroyed by the
1948 quitclaim deeds, in this case the children ended up with a life estate
and the reversion, prevented from merging by the contingent remainder in
their bodily heirs.
A year later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Beatty v. Miley.49 In
Beatty, Lillee Pearl Watt conveyed land by warranty deed to her husband,
William M. Watt, in 1925.50 The deed specified that William would hold
the land for so long as he and Lillee were married; upon the end of their
marriage, by death or otherwise, the land would go to either Lillee’s
children or their children, should they be deceased. In 1930, William
conveyed the land back to Lillee by warranty deed. 51 William died in 1932,
and Lillee’s three children brought a quiet title action thereafter. 52 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Whitten controlled, and thus William’s
conveyance of his present interest back to Lillee did not give her a fee
simple absolute.53 The children’s remainder (called “contingent” by the
court) blocked the merger of the present interests. 54
But Beatty’s pertinence to the destructibility doctrine is suspect from the
outset. In Beatty, the primary conveyance could be written as follows:
OA for so long as he and O remain married, and when O and A
are no longer married, to O’s children.55
47. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193; Douglass L. Mann, Recent Decision, Future
Interests—Contingent Remainders—Destructibility by Merger, 49 MICH. L. REV. 762 (1951).
48. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193.
49. Beatty v. Miley, 1951 OK 184, 233 P.2d 269.
50. Id. ¶ 15, 233 P.2d at 272.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 16, 233 P.2d at 273.
53. Id. ¶¶ 19, 233 P.2d at 273–74.
54. Id. ¶ 23, 233 P.2d at 273.
55. The pertinent language of the conveyance is as follows:
I, Lillee Pearl Watt . . . do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto William
M. Watt, my husband [land] . . . to hold said land during the time that the
relation of husband and wife exists between the Parties hereto and when such
relationship ceases because of death of either party or from other causes, this
property shall go in equal parts to children of [Ms. Watt], provided if any of
[her] children should die leaving children of their own, such children would
take the interest of [the] deceased child.
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At the time of the conveyance, Ms. Watt had three living children—
ascertainable individuals.56 Given that the children’s right of possession
was not conditioned on an uncertain event, they likely held vested
remainders subject to open (or subject to partial defeasance). 57 The court,
however, held that the remainders were contingent, applying Whitten to
conclude that the latter conveyance (from Mr. Watt to Ms. Watt) did not
result in merger.58 Of course, had the remainders been vested in the living
children, Ms. Watt would have had no reversion with which Mr. Watt’s
interest could merge. Regardless of what interest Mr. Watt held, 59 the
remainder interest here was not contingent, and thus the case does not speak
to the destructibility doctrine.
This leaves Whitten. First, it must be noted that Whitten’s result runs
contrary to the stated policy behind abrogation of the destructibility
doctrine. While the rule “tends to increase the alienability of land,” critics
attack the rule based on its perceived frustration of the grantor’s intent. 60

Id. ¶ 15, 233 P.2d at 272.
56. Id. ¶ 16, 233 P.2d at 273; see also Jacob F. May, Jr., Note, Future Interests: Vesting:
Supplanting Limitations: Adverse Possession, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 103 (1953).
57. A vested remainder subject to open is a remainder in a class where one of the class
members is born and ascertainable, and there is either no condition precedent or the class
member has satisfied the condition. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 114; see also May,
supra note 56, at 104 (“The test of vesting in interest is not whether the prior particular
estate upon which the remainder is dependent is subject to termination upon a contingency,
but rather, whether or not, throughout its continuance, the remainderman and his heirs ‘have
the right to the immediate possession, whenever and however the preceding freehold estates
may determine.’” (quoting LEWIS M. SIMES, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 30 (2d ed. 1951)).
58. Beatty, ¶¶ 19, 23, 233 P.2d at 273–74.
59. It is somewhat unclear from the language of the conveyance what Mr. Watt held. He
was given a present, possessory estate that he could hold until his marriage with Ms. Watt
ended. This estate was not potentially infinite in duration, since he was only able to hold it
for the length of the marriage—which was, at maximum, the length of his life or that of Ms.
Watt. But the estate could also end prior to Mr. Watt’s death—were he and Ms. Watt to
divorce, he would no longer have the right to possess. Mr. Watt, then, had a life estate,
which was subject to defeasance (either a life estate determinable or a life estate subject to a
condition subsequent). Regardless, the children held a vested remainder, as three were
ascertainable at the time the deed was executed.
60. Mann, supra note 47, at 764. Mann also references an oft-quoted passage by Justice
Holmes to explain why the destructibility doctrine ought to be done away with:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the reign of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
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Yet it is the grantor’s intent that is being frustrated here by failure to apply
the rule.61 Ms. Morris likely intended to give her two living children estates
in fee simple absolute by merger through her second transfer of her
reversion. Instead, the court prevented these interests from merging by
virtue of the contingent remainder in the bodily heirs of each child. Under
Whitten, the contingent remainder is given preference above all other
property interests, as well as above the grantor’s intent. If the intent of the
grantor is to be preferred above all else, 62 it would seem that the ephemeral
interests of persons unascertained (perhaps not even in existence yet)
should give way to the actions of the original grantor.63
Moreover, Whitten does not directly speak to the following scenario:
OA for life, then, if B is a lawyer, to B.
(At the time of A’s death, B is not a lawyer)
From the conveyance, A would hold a life estate, B a contingent
remainder, and O a reversion. Upon A’s death, the question becomes: Who
is entitled to present possession of the estate? Under the destructibility
doctrine, B’s remainder would be destroyed and O would receive present
possession by function of his reversion because B failed to become a lawyer
by the time of the life estate’s expiration. Without the destructibility
doctrine, the result is more ambiguous. One option would be to give O
present possession subject to defeasance; thus, O would receive a fee
simple subject to executory limitation, and B would hold a springing
executory interest.64 While O’s interest would be potentially infinite, B
could terminate it at his leisure: simply become a lawyer, and the land is
his.

Id. (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897)); see also Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 281 (N.M. 1979) (quoting
the same passage).
61. Mann, supra note 47, at 764.
62. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor’s intention.”).
63. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 32 (“A contingent remainder was not
considered a very substantial interest at common law. Hence, a contingent remainder was
not alienable inter vivos . . . .”).
64. See id. at 156–57 (examining statutory reforms to the destructibility doctrine and
concluding that, post-destructibility, deeds will result in the former remainderman holding
an executory interest, with the grantor possessing a defeasible fee after the expiration of the
life estate); see also Guzman, supra note 7, at 797.
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Interestingly enough, Whitten may not support this result. In Whitten, the
reversion was “subordinate to the contingent remainder because its
enjoyment is dependent upon the failure of the event upon the occurrence of
which the remainder was to vest.”65 In other words, Ms. Morris’s reversion
could ripen into a present, possessory estate if the event conditioning the
remainder, bodily heirs, “failed”—implying the death of the children—such
that the remainder did not vest. This “wait-and-see” approach is arguably
appropriate in this context. The destructibility rule holds that a contingent
remainder must vest at or before the expiration of its preceding estate. 66 If
the termination of the preceding estate is understood as the death of the life
tenant, rather than the merger of the life estate with a reversion, then
Whitten’s result evades rather than abrogates the destructibility doctrine.
Granted, this is a stretch: merger at common law is one way to terminate
a life estate, such that a contingent remainder would be destroyed by this
termination if it had failed to vest in time. 67 And reading this decision
narrowly requires setting aside the idea that merger would represent the
“expiration” of the preceding estate. 68 But under this reading, Whitten
would not be a wholesale rejection of destructibility. In fact, Whitten would
simply stand for the idea that the original deed, overall, is given preference:
the contingent remainder was created with a preceding life estate, and
assessing whether the remainder vests waits until this life estate “dies off,”
subsequent transfers notwithstanding. Regardless, the state of the
destructibility doctrine in Oklahoma is ambiguous at best, and absent
explicit statutory abolition, it stands to reason that the doctrine could remain
alive and active—or at least ripe for a renaissance.
Broadly speaking, then, Oklahoma’s future interest law might be
characterized as intermediate or moderate—situated somewhere between
the Restatement (Third)’s radical reforms and the traditional common law
of feudal England. Specific areas of the law appear unsettled or vague,
calling for renewed discussion of the policies that best embody Oklahoma’s
underlying sociopolitical values. Part III will discuss these values, along
with the notion that common-law doctrines, when conceptualized in a nonfeudal light, may both speak to Oklahoma’s land heritage and effectuate the
policies of alienability and grantor’s intent framing modern reform efforts.
65. Whitten v. Whitten, 1950 OK 93, ¶ 14, 219 P.2d 228, 232 (emphasis added).
66. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 192.
67. See id. § 197.
68. Perhaps we could conceptually differentiate the “termination” of a preceding estate—
say, through merger and forfeiture—with the “expiration” of the preceding estate—the
natural, foreordained death of the life tenant.
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But the strength of these efforts must be tested and examined. That is, what
are the primary effects of contemporary policy proposals on common-law
notions of real property and the owner’s relationship to it—and do they
accomplish that which they set out to achieve? Part II attempts to ask and
answer these important questions.
II. Modern Property Law—Recommendations and Problematics
Modern property law recommendations have focused on stripping away
the so-called relics of feudalism in favor of a simplified, straightforward
approach to estates and future interests. Here this Comment examines two
proposals: Professor Gallanis’s Uniform Future Interests Act 69 and
Professor Barros’s model law of estates and future interests.70 Both share
substantial similarities, aiming to pare down the current array of present and
future interests into a smaller galaxy of options for grantors. But in the
quest for a more transparent, streamlined system, both scholars leave
property owners with fewer ways to dispose of their land—and arguably
less power over the fee simple absolute central to modern conceptions of
ownership.71
A. Gallanis
Professor Gallanis proposes five major reforms to simplify the American
scheme of future interests.72 He begins with a familiar refrain, lambasting
the “late-medieval baggage” of future interest law that “revels in unhelpful
complexity, elevates form over substance, and frustrates the very
transactions it should facilitate.”73 In its place, Professor Gallanis offers his
Uniform Future Interests Act, which jettisons the cumbersome
classifications and substantive arcana of the future interest regime while
preserving the “temporal division of ownership that is at the heart of
modern property transactions.”74
His first reform allows full alienability of future interests, regardless of
classification.75 At common law, only vested interests could be alienated
69. See Gallanis, supra note 5.
70. See Barros, supra note 5.
71. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (“Today, because modern caselaw and
statutes favor the creation of the fee simple absolute, the fee simple absolute is the default
estate.”).
72. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 515.
73. Id. at 514.
74. Id. at 515.
75. Id.
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inter vivos, 76 whereas contingent remainders were treated as “mere
possibilities” not warranting recognition as actual property interests.77 This
reform follows the modern trend: the majority of states, Oklahoma
included, treat contingent remainders as alienable. 78 Alienability aligns with
the modern view that contingent remainders, like vested remainders,
amount to extant property rights, rather than possibilities. 79 While Professor
Gallanis acknowledges the real difference between vested and contingent
future interests, he nonetheless contends that this difference is reflected
through pricing—the market for contingent remainders may be scant, but
interest holders should still be able to alienate, even if only for paltry
sums. 80
The second reform considers the issue of failure in the future interest
context.81 Regarding failure, Professor Gallanis aims at a specific target: the
treatment of executory interests following a defeasible fee. 82 Executory
interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities; where the Rule voids
an executory interest, the result can differ depending on whether the
conveyance gave a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent. 83 Take the following:
Conveyance 1: OA for so long as a church is maintained on
the premises, and upon a church not being maintained, to B.
Conveyance 2: OA on condition that a church is maintained on
the property; but if a church is not maintained, to B.
In both examples, B holds an executory interest. The Rule Against
Perpetuities would void the interest in both examples. The results, however,
differ: whereas in Conveyance 1, A is left with a fee simple determinable, in
Conveyance 2, A is left with a fee simple absolute. Professor Gallanis

76. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–32.
77. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 515–16.
78. Id.; see also 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 25.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (holding future interests to be freely alienable).
Oklahoma treats contingent remainders as alienable. See 60 OKLA. STAT. § 30 (2011).
79. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 519–20.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 520. Professor Gallanis also addresses issues of acceleration, which are beyond
the scope of this Comment and, thus, will not be addressed.
82. Id. at 521.
83. Id.
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would treat the conveyances the same: upon the Rule Against Perpetuities
voiding B’s interest, A would hold the property in fee simple absolute.84
Gallanis’s third reform abolishes three future interest rules: the
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of
Worthier Title. 85 Professor Gallanis is conclusory in this section—a
common theme across scholarship addressing these rules86—calling on
those states that have yet to abrogate the rules to do so in the name of
modernity and grantor’s intent.87
The fourth reform substantially changes the Rule Against Perpetuities,
creating a “super-alienability” doctrine that voids all future interests unless
they terminate within ninety years of their creation. 88 This changes the Rule
Against Perpetuities from a filter discriminating against unvested future
interests to a broader oversight mechanism, balancing a preference for free
alienability and marketability against the so-called reign of the dead hand. 89
Thus, Professor Gallanis provides a legal backstop to prevent conveyances
from tying up land. 90
84. Professor Gallanis offers several justifications for this reform:
First, Anglo-American law has long had a strong policy in favor of the vesting
of estates. Allowing A to retain the property outright avoids the potential
divestiture of A’s possessory estate. Second, allowing A to retain the property
outright promotes marketability. Potential buyers will be more likely to
purchase the property from A because there is no chance of future divestment.
Third, the result gives effect to the grantor’s probable intention: namely, that a
fee simple limited by an executory interest should continue until the executory
interest takes effect . . . . Fourth and last, the result accords with the basic rule
on failure: future interests that fail are treated as if they had not been created.
Id. at 522–23.
85. Id. at 529.
86. See, e.g., 2,3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 16.2–16.3, 25.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (proffering perfunctory statements that
destructibility doctrine, Doctrine of Worthier Title, and Rule in Shelley’s Case are not
recognized as part of American law).
87. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 530–48.
88. Id. at 565. Gallanis’s proposal adopts a “wait-and-see” approach to future interests:
their validity is assessed ninety years after their creation. If they have failed to vest or
terminate by that period, they are voided. See id.
89. Id. at 559–60.
90. Id. at 558–59. Pointing to the increasing legal similarity between vested and
contingent future interests, Professor Gallanis heralds this reform:
[A] rule against the remoteness of vesting makes sense only if there is a good
reason to distinguish all categories of vested future interests from future
interests that are contingent. Yet the distinction between a contingent interest
and an interest that is vested subject to defeasance is often purely formal,
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The fifth and final reform appears the most radical, yet still flows
naturally from Professor Gallanis’s preceding recommendations. He
proposes eliminating the entire classificatory scheme for future interests,
assimilating all future interests—whether in the grantor or grantee—under a
unified “future interest” heading. 91 Professor Gallanis offers four
justifications, drawn from the preceding work of Professor Waggoner. 92
First, the complexity of the future interest classification scheme alone is
reason to jettison it.93 Second, the system is artificial, often failing to reflect
the substance of a conveyance. 94 Third, the system offers unearned benefits
to those who can master it, making it a strategic tool. 95 Finally, the scheme
values classification above all else, spilling into—and potentially
suffocating—broader questions of construction and enacting the grantor’s
intent.96 In light of these rationales (and the fact that an increasing number
of jurisdictions treat vested and contingent remainders almost identically),
Professor Gallanis takes Professor Waggoner’s scholarship one step further
by recommending a single future interest for all—grantor and grantee,
vested and contingent.97
B. Barros
Professor Barros proposes a broader reform of property law than
Professor Gallanis, focusing on the entire system of present and future
interests. But he also proceeds with more caution, aware of the difficulty of
introducing radical change into a system that has endured for centuries, in
one form or another.98 Prompted by the Restatement (Third)’s “cogent and

except in the jurisdictions that treat them differently for purposes of
alienability, acceleration, or destructibility. . . . [T]hose differences in treatment
are outmoded. Thus, there is little point in a rule separating defeasibly vested
interests from contingent ones. . . . [W]e can restrict the dead hand by providing
a direct limit on the duration of future interests. Controlling the dead hand does
not require us to use the blunt instrument of a rule against the remoteness of
vesting.
Id. at 560.
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id. at 561 (citing Waggoner, supra note 5).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 562–63.
98. Barros, supra note 5, at 24–28.
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elegant simplification of the system of estates and future interests,”99
Professor Barros declares his mission statement:
Th[e] complexity [of our system of land ownership] is
unnecessary. Many of the distinctions between the types of
interests are based on accidents of English legal history that are
not relevant to modern law. Five steps . . . could be taken to
drastically simplify the system of estates and future interests
while having a negligible impact on real-world legal issues. 100
Much like Professor Gallanis, Professor Barros draws inspiration from
American property law’s (perceived) needless complexity and antiquated
concepts.101 Primarily, he seeks simplification: according to Barros,
property systems should convey information easily and clearly, and the
American system currently fails to do so. 102 Moreover, Professor Barros
aims to clear out “unnecessary underbrush that has accumulated in law over
the past eight hundred years,” while retaining the bulk of the current
system. 103 Professor Barros makes his recommendations in the form of a
model law, suggesting the benefits of uniformity in an area that has
historically been marked by heterogeneity across states and locales. 104
Professor Barros’s first two suggestions are relatively uncontroversial. 105
In his third and fourth suggestions, however, Professor Barros calls for one
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id. at 21–22.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 21–22.
104. Professor Barros expounds on the issue of uniformity in discussing his choice of a
model law:
The abstract desirability of uniformity in law is the subject of much academic
discussion . . . . In property law, uniformity might be desirable in some contexts
but not others. On the one hand, land is quintessentially local, and some areas
of property law (particularly conveyancing) often reflect local conditions and
customs. In areas of property law where there is a lack of consensus on the best
approach to a particular issue, having different states follow different
approaches also may provide a laboratory of ideas to provide data on their
effects. . . . In the estates and future interests area, a case can be made for
uniformity because standardization in forms of ownership can better convey
information and reduce transaction costs.
Id. at 25–26.
105. First, he recommends abolishing the fee tail across the United States—a modest
proposal given that so few states still continue to recognize it. Second, Professor Barros
would abolish the distinction between shifting and springing executory interests, given that
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defeasible fee, merging the fee simple determinable, fee simple subject to
condition subsequent, and fee simple subject to an executory limitation into
one present estate—the Fee Simple Defeasible.106 This merged estate offers
two significant features. First, all future interests attached to it, whether in
the grantor or grantee, are treated as contingent. 107 The major ramification
of this decision is that all future interests attached to a defeasible estate
become subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.108 This runs contrary to
tradition, where the power of termination and the possibility of reverter in
the grantor were not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 109
Additionally, where the Rule Against Perpetuities voids the future interest,
the current holder of the present estate becomes the owner of a fee simple
absolute, rather than the owner of a defeasible fee. 110
The second unique feature of Professor Barros’s Fee Simple Defeasible
is its treatment of future interests in the grantor. At common law, a grantor
could retain one of two future interests when conveying a defeasible fee: a
power of termination or a possibility of reverter. 111 The possibility of
reverter took effect immediately upon the grantee, in possession of the
present estate, breaching the condition attached to the land. 112 The power of
termination, however, lacked automatic enforcement—the grantor could
choose to exercise this “power” or could simply decline and allow the
grantee to continue in possession. 113 Under Professor Barros’s regime, the
distinctions between the two would vanish, with one contingent future
interest replacing the common-law grantor interests.114 More importantly,
this new future interest takes on the properties of the power of
termination—the grantor, holding the contingent future interest, may end
the defeasible estate only by asserting his or her power to terminate in
writing. 115
Professor Barros’s future interest recommendations—collectively, his
fifth reform overall—hold equal significance and share some
there is little legal difference between the two beyond categorization and naming
convention. See id. at 18.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 39.
108. Id. at 45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 46.
111. Id. at 41.
112. BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 281.
113. See id. § 241.
114. Barros, supra note 5, at 41.
115. Id. at 42.
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commonalities with those of Professor Gallanis. Professor Barros would
install a simplified future interest regime differentiating on the basis of
vesting. 116 In part this stems from his treatment of all future interests as
freely alienable, abrogating the common law’s previously significant
distinction between vested and contingent interests. 117 But unlike Professor
Gallanis, Professor Barros retains the vested-contingent dichotomy, basing
his decision on the intuitive logic behind the distinction, as well as the
broader pragmatism undergirding his incremental approach to reform. 118
Even so, Professor Barros offers a radical departure from the longenduring, Anglo-American future interest regime. First, like Professor
Gallanis, Professor Barros jettisons the destructibility doctrine, the Rule in
Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title, invoking his “clearing
the underbrush” rationale for this change. 119 While Professor Barros retains
much of the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, he does make minor
changes based on vesting, subjecting future interests in the grantor to the
Rule while exempting the traditionally-susceptible vested remainder subject
to open. 120 Finally, Professor Barros’s model law prefers alienability and
vesting through rules of construction: ambiguous conveyances will be
interpreted to create vested future interests, and contingent future interests
are interpreted in a manner that would hasten vesting.121 Thus, in Professor
Barros’s ideal future interest regime, we are left with two categories of
future interests: vested future interests (which may be indefeasibly vested,
subject to partial divestment, or subject to total divestment) and contingent
future interests.122 Vested interests are in “an ascertained person and not
subject to a condition precedent,” whereas contingent interests are “either
in an unascertained person or . . . subject to a condition precedent.” 123
These future interests operate in a landscape stripped of feudal doctrines
and emphasizing systemic alienability.124

116. Id. at 50.
117. Id. at 49.
118. Id. at 52–53.
119. Id. at 58–62.
120. Id. at 58–59. At common law the vested remainder subject to open was subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 107.
121. Barros, supra note 5, at 62–63.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id. at 30–31.
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C. Problematics for These Modern Approaches
Pause for a moment and consider the systems proposed by Professors
Barros and Gallanis. Both scholars undoubtedly accomplish their
overarching goals: simplification, modernization, and promotion of
alienability. Professor Gallanis makes the more radical recommendations:
his system distills down to one future interest—period—which is fully
alienable in life or at death, its only limitation a “super-alienability”
doctrine mandating that it become possessory within ninety years of its
creation. Professor Barros, though writing on the entire Anglo-American
property scheme, takes a more modest approach: unlike Professor Gallanis,
he retains the Rule Against Perpetuities with little change, and he
distinguishes future interests based on vesting.
But both scholars create a substantially similar landscape in several
ways. First, alienability reigns supreme, whether clothed in the raiment of
“grantor’s intent” or standing on its own two feet. Even if the market for
certain future interests is weak or non-existent, the interests remain
alienable—it is the interest holder’s prerogative whether to barter them
away, regardless of the price garnered. Second, simplicity remains at the
forefront of the schema. Both scholars whittle down the categories of future
interests substantially, eliminating a great deal of nuance for the sake of
clarity and ease of understanding. Third, where changes are made, the
grantee tends to reap the benefits. Both systems subject future interests in
the grantor to the Rule Against Perpetuities (or its successor), and under
this framework, the grantee often ends up holding in fee simple absolute—
even if the grantor originally conveyed a defeasible fee or less-tangible
future interest. The systems are undoubtedly easier to follow than the
common-law regime, and some of Professors Barros and Gallanis’
suggestions are well taken. 125 But these suggestions are not unencumbered
by their own difficulties.
125. For instance, Professor Gallanis’s detailed consideration of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is the type of in-depth discussion often missing from debates about, say, the
destructibility doctrine. It may be worthwhile to reform this law of alienability, perhaps by
extending the perpetuities period beyond the classic “lives in being plus 21 years.”
Moreover, as Professor Barros recommends, protecting all vested remainders from the Rule
would seem to make sense, given the conceptual difference between a right that is vested
and one that is contingent. That being said, grantor’s interests ought to remain immune from
the Rule, owing to the idea that the ultimate locus of power ought to be with the original
owner. Subjecting the grantor’s reversion, for instance, to the Rule would have the systemic
effect of shifting power away from the conveyer—who was the person in charge of
dispensing that power in the first place.
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1. The Defeasibility Reforms
Take Professor Barros’s reforms to the defeasible fees. Recall that he
proposes one defeasible fee—the Fee Simple Defeasible—to replace the
tripartite, common-law scheme. At common law, the following
conveyances operate differently:
OA for so long as alcohol is never consumed on the premises.
OA on condition that alcohol is never consumed on the
premises; if it is, back to O.
Under the first conveyance, the grantee holds a fee simple determinable,
and the grantor retains a possibility of reverter. The possibility of reverter is
self-actualizing: upon the condition being breached, the possessory right
instantly flows back to the grantor—no action needed. 126 The second
conveyance, however, gives the grantee a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, with the grantor retaining a power of termination. Here, upon
the grantee breaching the condition, nothing happens automatically: the
grantor may choose to invoke her power of termination, or not.127 The
grantee’s possession remains rightful until the grantor acts.128
This difference does not survive Professor Barros’s model law. In his
scheme, these defeasible estates—along with the fee simple subject to an
executory limitation—become one. Moreover, the “future interest” held by
the grantor operates like a power of termination, with the possibility of
reverter effectively scrubbed from the legal rolls. The most glaring issue
with this is its potential disregard for the perennial justification of such
reforms: grantor’s intent. Consider the following:
CONVEYANCE 1: Grantor Bob would like his nephew, Phil, to
have some land for his 21st birthday. But Bob knows as well as
the next guy that Phil is a bit of a deadbeat—he’s slovenly, prone
to poor judgment, and an all-around louse. But Bob is hopeful
that giving Phil something to work on and own himself might
instill some much-needed work ethic in him. So he crafts the
following conveyance: “I, Bob, give to you, Phil, Greenacre, to
hold in fee simple for so long as you never have a kegger on the
grounds.”

126. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 281.
127. See id. § 241.
128. See id.
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CONVEYANCE 2: Bob again, but this time he’s looking to give
his other nephew, Bill, something. Bill is an upstanding gent, a
real cracker-jack of a guy (nothing like Phil). He’s bound for law
school and destined for greatness—the scion of the family.
While Bob still wants to make sure his land is taken care of in
the proper fashion, he is not terribly worried about Bill and his
judgment. So he crafts the following conveyance: “I, Bob, give
to you, Bill, Blueacre, to hold in fee simple on the condition that
you never have a kegger on the grounds; if you do, I’ll take
Blueacre back.”
At common law, the differences between Bob’s conveyances matter. In
Conveyance 1, Bob gets the land back as soon as Phil throws his
(inevitable) kegger. But in Conveyance 2, Bob has options: if Bill screws
up, Bob can choose to let it slide (everyone makes mistakes, right?) or take
back the land. Maybe Phil showed up and had the party without Bill’s
knowledge. Regardless, Bob can rest on his laurels and deliberate as to Bill,
whereas Phil has already reached his proverbial third strike (on the first
kegger thrown).
Of course, all this evaporates in the Barros scheme. These two
conveyances—regardless of wording, and certainly regardless of
background narrative—become a Fee Simple Defeasible grant. Bob retains
a contingent future interest, subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and not
self-actualizing. Perhaps with Bill this presents no problem—the new
conveyance looks quite a bit like the common-law one. But the problem lies
with Phil, who suddenly has a much better shot of holding onto Greenacre
no matter his choices. Were Phil to breach the condition, Bob must act. And
Phil could embroil the two in protracted litigation and gamesmanship in an
effort to hold onto the property.
More broadly, the reforms deprive Bob from the outset of even the
option to craft Conveyance 1. Now, if he wants to make a conditional
conveyance to anyone, he is stuck with considerably attenuated power: he
can give the grantee a defeasible present estate, but his retained future
interest may be void from the start, and if it does manage to survive, it is
effectively nothing more than a power to litigate. This for the man who
began as “king of the castle,” master of the Fee Simple Absolute that was
his domain. 129 Perhaps Bob will just hold onto the land, rather than give
129. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–3 (noting that the fee simple absolute is the
fullest complement of rights and “most complete form of ownership” available at common
law).
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away so much. And so we end up with a perverse (and unintended) result:
less market-wide alienation of land stemming from a policy predicated on
alienation.
Professor Barros’s reforms would also have tangible, real-world impact,
as illustrated by a recent Oklahoma case, Ator v. Unknown Heirs.130 In
1954, Thelma Ator and her husband gifted a fee simple determinable to the
Owasso Independent School District by warranty deed.131 As a fee simple
determinable, the gift was conditional, and the deed stated that the
conveyance’s sole purpose was to enable Owasso School District to
maintain a football program on the land. 132 Owasso School District
complied with the condition for forty years, building a football stadium and
playing its games on the parcel.133 However, the high school varsity team
ceased playing its games on the parcel in 1994, and no district football
teams played games on the parcel after September 2001; instead, the district
permitted a private organization, the Future Owasso Rams, to use the parcel
and its facilities. 134
When Thelma Ator died intestate, her son and sole heir filed a quiet title
action, arguing that the parcel was rightfully his given the district’s breach
of the condition.135 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed with Mr.
Ator, finding that the land had reverted back to Thelma Ator when the
school district stopped complying with the conditions of the deed. 136
While the nature of the conveyance was undisputed, its classification is
significant, particularly considering Professor Barros’s suggested reforms.
Remember that the fee simple determinable belongs in the larger class of

130. 2006 OK CIV APP 120, 146 P.3d 821.
131. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 146 P.3d at 823–24.
132. The deed stated, in pertinent part:
[T]his conveyance . . . is solely for the construction and maintenance on said
property of a football playing field and stadium for the use and benefit of the
students of said School District, for so long as said real property shall be used
for such purposes as a part of a regularly organized and fully scheduled
program of football practice and playing . . . . [A]nd . . . if at any time after the
date hereof, [Owasso School District] shall fail to comply fully with the terms
of this deed or said agreement or observe the spirit thereof, the grant shall
become null and void and the full fee simple title to said property shall revert to
and vest in [Mr. and Mrs. Ator], their heirs and assigns forever.
Id. ¶ 3, 146 P.3d at 823–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. ¶ 4, 146 P.3d at 824.
134. Id. ¶¶ 5–7, 146 P.3d at 824–25.
135. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9, 146 P.3d at 823, 825.
136. See id. ¶¶ 13, 18, 146 P.3d at 826–27.
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defeasible fees; 137 typically created with language of duration, the fee
simple determinable leaves the grantor with a possibility of reverter, which
operates immediately upon the conveyance’s condition being broken. 138
Thus, when the Owasso school district stopped playing football on the
gifted parcel, it violated the terms of Thelma Ator’s deed, thereby losing
title to the land. In other words, the school district wrongfully possessed
that land once it ceased football operations on it. 139
Now apply Professor Barros’s model to this conveyance. In its entirety,
Professor Barros’s reforms would leave Thelma Ator and her heirs with
nothing, as her possibility of reverter would be subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Ms. Ator’s conveyance, simply stated, is as follows: “Thelma
Ator to Owasso School District for so long as the district plays football on
the property (and upon football not being played there, back to Ator).” The
language of duration indicates that Owasso school district now holds a fee
simple determinable, and Thelma Ator a possibility of reverter. But this
possibility need not vest within the lives in being plus twenty-one years.
Theoretically, Owasso could continue to play football on this parcel
forever. Thus, Ms. Ator’s future interest, under Professor Barros’s scheme,
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and, consequently, is void. Indeed, if
Thelma Ator had wanted to condition the land grant on football operations
alone, she is left with virtually no tools to do so; unless she ensures that her
possibility of reverter will vest within twenty-one years of the lives in being
contemporaneous with the grant, it will invariably run afoul of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
Even if Professor Barros’s expansion of the Rule Against Perpetuities
were not applied to Thelma Ator’s conveyance, 140 Ms. Ator still encounters
some difficulties. Under the Barros scheme, all defeasible fees merge into
the Fee Simple Defeasible, 141 the consequence being that future interests
held by the grantor are treated as powers of termination, rather than as
possibilities of reverter.142 In other words, under Barros’s reforms, Owasso
school district’s present estate—its right to possess the parcel granted to
them by Thelma Ator—would continue until the holder of Ms. Ator’s
137. See 2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 44 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
138. See id.
139. See Ator, ¶¶ 13, 16–17, 146 P.3d at 826–27.
140. Professor Barros’s application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to future interests in
the grantor accompanying a defeasible present estate is not retroactive—the only provision
in his model law not applied retroactively. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67.
141. Id. at 41.
142. Id. at 42.
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contingent future interest asserts his or her power of termination in
writing. 143 Unlike Professor Barros’s expansion of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, this reform is applied retroactively.144 Moreover, equitable
defenses typically inapplicable to the fee simple determinable (such as
estoppel) are made applicable to the newly-merged Fee Simple Defeasible
and its accompanying future interests. 145
The consequences for Ms. Ator would be significant. Ms. Ator’s interest
would be transformed into a mere power of termination, rather than the
possibility of reverter she intended to retain. As a result, Owasso school
district would be in rightful possession of the gifted property unless and
until Ms. Ator or her heirs asserted the power to terminate. But, at this
point, Owasso could choose to embroil the parties in prolonged litigation,
and it would have additional equitable defenses at its disposal that could
potentially thwart Ms. Ator’s original future interest. Compare this with the
state of affairs in the actual case: upon the school district ceasing football
operations on the gifted property, title to the land reverted back to Ms. Ator
automatically. Owasso school district became a trespasser, not a rightful
possessor—and the possibility of rightful ownership through adverse
possession was at least fifteen years away. 146 Thus, the likelihood that Mr.
Ator would have failed in his quiet title action under a Barros regime, as
compared with his actual victory under current Oklahoma law, is
substantially greater. This notion is particularly troubling given that
Oklahoma has traditionally treated the power of termination as a much
weaker interest than the possibility of reverter. 147
143. See id.; see also LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 (“[W]hen O creates a fee
simple on condition subsequent, he is not entitled to possession until he demands
possession.”).
144. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67.
145. Id. at 43.
146. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 93(4) (2011) (applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for
most property actions, apart from enumerated exceptions).
147. Ludwig v. William K. Warren Found., 1990 OK 96, ¶¶ 7–8, 809 P.2d 660, 662
(recognizing that, at Oklahoma common law, the power of termination was inalienable,
while the possibility of reverter is alienable); Frensley v. White, 1953 OK 79, ¶ 5, 254 P.2d
982, 984 (“The estate remaining in the grantor after the conveyance of [a fee simple
determinable] is a possibility of reverter which he may convey, it being considered an
interest in the land. . . . Next, there is the fee estate upon condition subsequent which is a fee
simple except that it may be terminated by the grantor by re-entry upon the happening of
some possible event, subsequently. What remains to the grantor after the conveyance of such
an estate is a power . . . which is not an interest in the land and is not sufficiently in esse to
be subject to conveyance.” (emphasis added)). But see 60 OKLA. STAT. §§ 29–30, 40 (2011)
(abolishing the common-law rule against alienation of powers of termination).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

968

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:943

Professor Barros’s defeasible fee reforms, then, present concerns both in
theory and in fact. They leave the powers of the grantor significantly
attenuated: the landowner has fewer ways to convey her land and less of an
interest in that land once conveyed. While the future interests
accompanying the defeasible fees may be increasingly similar in operation
under the law, including Oklahoma law, the common-law distinctions
continue to matter, as evinced by Ator. And eliminating these distinctions
skews the system towards grantees at the expense of grantors. In some
ways, this runs counter to the modern preference for grantor’s intent. 148
While the new system may be simplified and more streamlined, it carves
out many of the privileges typically associated with ownership, favoring
macro-alienability while weakening individual authority over real property.
2. The Feudal Future Interest Rules
Both Professors Gallanis and Barros propose eliminating the
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of
Worthier Title. 149 Further, both scholars make changes to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 150 In many ways, these are merely the denouement to a
decades-long erosion; while the Rule Against Perpetuities remains intact in
some form across the country, 151 feudal future interest rules have fared
much worse.152 But these doctrines have not garnered the robust defense
(or, perhaps the requiem) that they have earned. And while their feudal
roots may now be obsolete, the concepts themselves deserve a second look,
especially in particular states and property regimes. Though the following
discussion focuses on the destructibility doctrine for this second look, it
offers observations likewise salient to debates over the Rule in Shelley’s
Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title.
Principally, the destructibility doctrine states that a contingent remainder
must vest before or at the time of the preceding estate. 153 If it does not meet

148. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE INTENT §§
11.1–11.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
149. See Barros, supra note 5, at 59–62; Gallanis, supra note 5, at 529-48.
150. See Barros, supra note 5, at 58–59; Gallanis, supra note 5, at 549–60.
151. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 550–53 (noting that the Rule Against Perpetuities, in some
form, persists in most states).
152. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, §§ 209, 1563, 1612 (detailing the state of the
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title across
jurisdictions).
153. Id. § 193.
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this condition, it is destroyed. 154 For example, consider the following
conveyance:
OA for life, then if B is twenty-one to B155
O, the grantor, conveys to A, the grantee, a life estate, giving A the present
right to possess the land for the duration of A’s life. B receives a future
interest, and more specifically, a contingent remainder—a remainder
because it follows a life estate, and contingent because it is conditioned on
an event that may not occur.156 At the expiration of the life estate—likely,
A’s death—B may take the interest if B is twenty-one. Under the
destructibility doctrine, if B is not twenty-one, his interest is destroyed, and
the land returns to O, or to her heirs or devisees, as a function of O’s
reversion.
Different rules apply, however, where the destructibility doctrine is not
in force. If B is not twenty-one at the expiration of A’s life estate, B may
still take the interest, provided he turns twenty-one at some point. The
present right to possess will likely belong to the grantor, but at a price. Now
the grantor effectively holds a defeasible fee, with the contingent remainder
acting as an executory interest. Should B turn twenty-one at some point, he
will gain O’s original fee simple absolute. This poses several problems,
particularly when considered in light of the justifications for abolishing the
destructibility doctrine.
The rationale for abolition of this doctrine most frequently turns on
property law’s ever-familiar friend—“grantor’s intent.”157 But this
argument is not as ironclad as it may first appear. Consider once more the
conveyance above: the argument in favor of preserving B’s contingent
remainder would turn on an idea of what O wanted in the first place. That
is, readers of the grant assume that O wanted B to turn twenty-one—full
stop. If B is not yet twenty-one at the time A’s life estate expires, preserving
B’s contingent remainder in the hopes that it may vest later will work to
effectuate O’s original intent. But consider the following scenario:
Harry owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute. He’s a self-made
millionaire at the age of 24—no small feat—and Blackacre
represents the culmination of this fortune: a sprawling property
154. Id.
155. Assume for all examples that O holds a fee simple absolute.
156. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 111.
157. See Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 281 (N.M. 1979); BORRON, JR.,
supra note 5, § 193.
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that stands as an American Versailles. But Harry hails from
humble beginnings—the son of farmers, Bob and Betty. Bob and
Betty, elderly and ailing, still live in their modest farmhouse on
their modest acreage. Harry decides to pay back his parents.
Knowing he will be out of the country indefinitely on business,
he starts drafting the following conveyance:
“I, Harry, convey to Bob and Betty, Blackacre for life . . .”
But Harry pauses. Given his plans and his parents’ advanced
age, he would like to ensure that Blackacre is cared for after their
deaths. So he adds an additional clause:
“ . . ., then if he graduates law school, to my brother, Fred.”
Fred is Harry’s older brother, who has been struggling for years
to get through law school. Harry is hopeful that this “carrot” will
finally push Fred over the finish line. But if Fred cannot graduate
by the time that his parents’ life estate expires, then good
riddance: Harry would rather reassess his options for the
property.
Admittedly, this hypothetical is long-winded and somewhat farfetched—but intentionally so, as the intent of the grantor is not always so
clear, either on the face of the conveyance or from contextual clues.
Without Harry’s direct testimony, a court may very well construe Harry’s
intent in error, believing him to have wanted Fred to graduate law school no
matter what. Of course, Harry’s intent is effectuated under the
destructibility doctrine: if, at the time of the life estate’s expiration, Fred
has not yet graduated law school, Fred’s contingent remainder is destroyed,
and Harry reacquires the land via his reversion. But absent application of
the destructibility doctrine, Fred’s remainder remains. While Harry will get
the present right to possess Blackacre, owing to his reversion, Fred can
divest Harry of this right—and, indeed, hold Blackacre in fee simple
absolute—as soon as he graduates law school.
This result poses numerous issues. First, the result is particularly
perverse if Harry relied on the destructibility doctrine in crafting his
conveyance. Not every state has abolished the doctrine, 158 and modern-day

158. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193 (noting that Oregon and Florida continue to
recognize the doctrine).
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conveyances may still be drafted in its shadow. 159 But both Professors
Gallanis and Barros make their policy reforms retroactive. 160 Professor
Barros notes that such retroactivity is not troubling given that, in many
cases, it often will comport with the grantor’s intent. 161 However, as the
example above demonstrates, the grantor’s intent is seldom self-evident,
and retroactive application of destructibility reform may act to frustrate,
rather than effectuate, the grantor’s intent—irrespective of whether the
grantor relied on an extant (or redacted) destructibility doctrine.
The second problem is one of math. A basic tenet of property law is that
the grantor may not convey more than she holds. 162 For example, if O holds
a life estate, she may not convey away a fee simple absolute; 163 she may, of
course, convey a life estate to another individual, but that present estate will
terminate with O’s death. 164 In the same sense, property transfers must
distill down to a “1 = 1” transaction. If O holds a fee simple absolute and
seeks to convey part of it, every piece of the fee simple “pie” must be
accounted for.165 To illustrate, consider the following scenario:
Deed 1: OA for life
In Deed 1, O begins with a fee simple absolute. Seeking to convey away
part of this, O gives a life estate to A. The remaining piece of O’s fee simple
absolute is accounted for in O’s reversion. Mathematically speaking, this
results in “Fee Simple Absolute = Life Estate + Reversion.” Contrast with
the following conveyances:
Deed 2: OA for so long as beer is never consumed on the
premises; if beer is consumed, to B.

159. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 5, at 64–65 (acknowledging the difficulties with
applying reforms retroactivity given grantors’ expectations at the time of the conveyance).
160. Professor Barros applies all of his reforms, save his Rule Against Perpetuities
changes, retroactively. See id. at 64–66. Professor Gallanis uses the same tactic. See
Gallanis, supra note 5, at 569.
161. Barros, supra note 5, at 66.
162. This principle may be described as nemo dat quod non habet (“No one transfers (a
right) that he does not possess”) or nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse
haberet (“No one can transfer to another a greater right than he himself might have”). See
Legal Maxims, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1932, 1934 (10th ed. 2014).
163. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 195 (describing fraudulent transfer of fee by life
tenant).
164. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 6.
165. See id. at 17 (“Mathematically speaking, the sum of the present and any future
interests must equal the fee simple absolute.”).
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Deed 3: OA for life, remainder in B.
Deed 4: OA for life, then if B graduates law school, to B.
Deed 2 has O, holding in fee simple absolute, conveying a defeasible fee
(the fee simple subject to an executory limitation) to A. Should A violate the
condition attached to his fee simple, the entire parcel of land will go to B,
who holds an executory interest in fee simple absolute. Mathematically, this
is “Fee Simple Absolute = Fee Simple Subject to Executory Limitation +
Executory Interest.” Deed 3 and 4 represent variations on Deed 1 in which
O, the grantor, has included a future interest to a third party. In Deed 3, B
holds a vested remainder, as it is not conditioned upon any event happening
and is given to a person born and ascertained. 166 In this example, O holds
nothing—the land is certain (or virtually certain) to go to B upon the
expiration of A’s life estate. Thus, the conveyance equation becomes “Fee
Simple Absolute = Life Estate + Vested Remainder.”
Deed 4 is where things get interesting. Here, B’s remainder is
contingent—unless B graduates law school, he cannot take. And because
B’s remainder is contingent, O holds a reversion (should B fail to meet the
condition, O will retrieve the property in fee simple absolute).
Mathematically, the conveyance is “Fee Simple Absolute = Life Estate +
Reversion + Contingent Remainder.” Take particular note of the
similarities to Deed 1. In terms of ensuring that all pieces of the Fee Simple
pie are accounted for, B’s contingent remainder adds nothing. This math
persists, regardless of whether the destructibility doctrine is in force. Unlike
its vested cousin, the contingent remainder is unnecessary to account for the
entirety of the fee simple absolute—a reversion or a vested remainder
combined with a preceding life estate will always comprise the entire fee
simple absolute.
Likewise, a defeasible fee combined with a future interest in the grantor
or grantee (that is, either a possibility of reverter or power of termination in
the grantor or an executory interest in the grantee) are in total equal to the
fee simple absolute. That the contingent remainder is a mere footnote in the
math of property transfers likely reflects the common-law destructibility

166. See id. at 26 (describing a remainder as vested when the remainderman is born and
ascertainable, and the remainder becoming a present possessory interest is not subject to a
condition precedent).
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doctrine, as well as the common law’s treatment of the contingent
remainder as a mere “possibility” rather than as a concrete interest.167
But abolishing the destructibility doctrine does a disservice to this basic
math. With Deed 4, should B fail to graduate law school by the time of A’s
life estate expiring, B’s contingent remainder survives if the destructibility
doctrine is not in place. While O will likely regain the present right to
possess the land, she now holds what is most easily classified as a
defeasible fee (more specifically, a fee simple subject to executory
limitation). B’s contingent remainder, while not formally reclassified, now
acts as an executory interest, capable of divesting O of her fee simple
estate. Thus, the “alchemy” of the post-destructibility regime transmogrifies
the “patient and polite” remainder into the violent, divesting, and
traditionally indestructible executory interest.168
This result comports with neither common-law nor modern property
concepts, regardless of destructibility. First, the contingent remainder is
amplified beyond its traditional confines. It becomes as secure and concrete
an interest as the vested remainder, if not stronger—the vested remainder,
unlike this “saved” contingent remainder, does not divest the grantor of
anything, but rather follows the natural expiration of the preceding, present
estate. Moreover, preserving the contingent remainder frustrates the
grantor’s interests at several levels—an ironic outcome, considering the
destructibility doctrine is typically abolished in the name of the grantor.
Without destructibility, the grantor’s reversion becomes subordinate to the
grantee’s contingent remainder.
This subordination is even more stark in cases of merger. Traditionally,
component parts of a larger present estate will combine if held by the same
individual.169 Thus, if O conveyed a life estate to A, with a contingent
remainder in B, and then subsequently sold her reversion to A, A would
traditionally hold a fee simple absolute, as the reversion would combine
with the life estate into the fee (as the math shows). But without
destructibility, everything falls before the contingent remainder. O may still
sell her reversion to A, but A may only hold the reversion and his present
life estate separately—and he may still lose his reversion if at some point in
time B fulfills the condition that limits his remainder. Given that the
167. See id. at 32 (discussing that, at common law, the contingent remainder was an
insubstantial interest and, thus, was not alienable inter vivos); 2 TIFFANY, supra note 9, §
320 (“A contingent remainder is merely the possibility or prospect of an estate.”).
168. See 2 TIFFANY, supra note 9, §§ 317, 364 (noting that remainders do not terminate
the preceding estate, while executory interests do).
169. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 9, § 70.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

974

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:943

reversion is traditionally viewed as a vested interest, 170 a grantee’s
contingent future interest defeating a vested interest originally in the grantor
seems doubly concerning. In fact, this failure to allow merger ultimately
defeats the grantor’s intent, expressed by her decision to sell the reversion
to A, the grantee. To paraphrase a maxim from contract law: absent
destructibility, B receives more than he bargained for.
These possibilities suggest the presence of at least one broader concern
with respect to the notion of ownership and autonomy. Grantors who own
in fee simple absolute hold the most robust bundle of real property rights
under the Anglo-American property scheme. 171 An interest in fee simple
absolute is freely alienable, descendible, and devisable;172 it commands the
highest market value and imbues the owner with the fullest complement of
powers and privileges.173 But modern reforms to old feudal doctrines—
including, for example, the broad-scale elimination of the destructibility
doctrine from state law—have slowly and subtly chipped away at this
complement of powers. While a change in the treatment of one type of
future interest hardly constitutes a national crisis, it does require a
previously neglected assessment of our state and national conceptions of
private property (that is, privately-owned land) and the locus of power visà-vis individual ownership and third-party rights holders.
None of the rationales frequently trotted out adequately address these
issues. First, the mere fact that the destructibility doctrine is cast as a
“feudal relic”174 is insufficient reason to abandon it without some debate.
Legal rules and doctrines devoid of all logic and purpose, due to the
passage of time or (perhaps) bad policy to begin with, ought not to remain
on the rolls. But law may yet find new life in the shifting sands of societal
development, and the original pillars that held it high may be organically
replaced by new, if different, scaffolding. Purported desuetude, intoned as
an incantation yet wielded as a blunt scythe, is a feature of the discussion,
not the entire dialogue itself.
Moreover, given that property law is fundamentally local in this
country,175 a state-by-state analysis of common-law doctrines may be
fruitful for determining the efficacy of particular ideas. Part III of this
170. See 2 id. § 311a.
171. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–3.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Gallanis, supra note 5, at 534 (“[T]he destructibility rule is a feudal relic
inconsistent with modern law.”).
175. See 1 TIFFANY, supra note 9, § 1.
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Comment features such an analysis, tailored specifically to Oklahoma.
Indeed, even in light of demands that property laws facilitate greater
interstate commerce, Professor Barros acknowledges that United States
property law may vary across state boundaries—and that such variance is
justified and viable. 176
Second, the topic of alienability frequently appears in arguments
favoring reform. 177 But alienability occurs at multiple levels, and the
alienability best served by abolition is macro in scale. That is, by
empowering grantees, abolition ensures that land is likely to change hands
downstream, to see more owners over a stretch of decades. An egalitarian
argument178 lives within this: treating the contingent remainder as
indestructible presents opportunities for broadening the class of landowners
and restricting the concentration of land in a few hands over time. 179
But these potential benefits sometimes have downsides for the grantor.
First, the grantor’s power to alienate her land diminishes without the
destructibility doctrine. The grantor is bound by the initial conveyance, and
while the result may ultimately be faithful to her initial intention,
faithfulness is not guaranteed. Regardless, the grantor is deprived of
potential future opportunities to dispose of her land as she sees fit. More
broadly, denying the grantor a second chance to alienate the land denigrates
the grantor’s capacity for intention. Abolition of the destructibility doctrine
is, in part, justified on a reified notion of grantor’s intent (or what is
believed to be that intent). Thus, courts preserve the contingent remainder
in order to effectuate the grantor’s intent gleaned from the original deed.
This is a risky business at numerous levels. Courts may interpret the
language of the instrument incorrectly—the grantor gave a contingent
remainder, after all, and the face of the deed may not indicate how the
grantor secretly hoped it would be treated. Moreover, the grantor, simply by
virtue of being human, has a necessarily dynamic intent. By giving the
contingent remainder’s limitation new life after the expiration of the
preceding estate, the grantor thus becomes bound to the “intent” embodied
176. See Barros, supra note 5, at 25–26 (discussing debates over uniformity).
177. See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 5, at 568 (offering as a proposed reform that all future
interests shall be freely alienable).
178. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding as constitutional
under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause Hawaii’s program of land redistribution aiming
at excessive concentration of real property in too few hands).
179. Conversely, abolishing the destructibility doctrine may chill systemic alienation.
Presented with fewer options for alienation, the grantor may choose to hold onto his land
until death, rather than risk the land falling into unexpected hands.
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by the original deed. But this intent may be stale—circumstances may have
changed, and the grantor may seek to alienate her property in a different
way than she initially intended. 180 Thus, the “grantor’s intent” argument is
more complex than its typical presentation, and certain feudal doctrines
may actually do more service to the grantor’s intent, in spite of myriad
attacks levied against them.
A larger point lies at the heart of these criticisms: reforms like abolition
work to both erode property rights and to transfer power away from the
grantor. Merely by eliminating the destructibility doctrine, the grantor has
fewer tools by which to convey her land. Nuanced division of real property
is a hallmark of English and American property law; it is a familiar tenet of
first-year property to discuss the “bundle of sticks” and the many ways in
which that bundle can be divided and dispensed. 181 While simplification of
the law is an admirable goal, it comes at a cost. Overly simplified systems
of property subtly deprive the owner—arguably the party the system is
most interested in protecting—of rights and privileges traditionally enjoyed.
While modern trends make both vested and contingent remainders
alienable, for instance, vested and contingent remainders are hardly
synonymous. And, while placing the words of limitation before (rather than
after) the words of purchase may seem irrelevant, such placement may truly
indicate a choice on the part of the grantor, one signaling that the
contingency is superordinate to the taker’s taking. A system that boils down
to the black and white of “present interest” and “future interest” loses this
texture and nuance, making ownership, a fundamentally human activity,
problematically two-dimensional.
Ultimately, systems of law are built and arranged around policy choices
and foundational principles. They represent an application of grander
notions concerning relationships and power. Thus, the American system—
and certainly Oklahoma’s—should be built around the grantor’s
foundational power, as an expression of society’s broader notions of
individual autonomy, freedom, and private ownership. Just as the plaintiff
is the master of her claim182 and the offeror master of her offer, 183 so too
180. Cf. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting
that an offer will lapse after a “reasonable time,” or after the period for acceptance that the
offeror has specified in the offer).
181. See CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 17, at 2–3.
182. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting that the wellpleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff “the master of the claim”).
183. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 cmt. a (“The offeror is the master of
his offer.”).
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should the grantor be master of her house. 184 Public policy may still have
something to say about tying up title over decades and centuries (as with
the abolition of the fee tail and the discussion of the Rule Against
Perpetuities), but the grantor should have a kaleidoscopic selection of
alienation tools at her disposal, rather than checking “Column A” or
“Column B.” Oklahoma’s grander ideas and political theories may offer
justifications for such a selection.
III. Saving Feudal Doctrines Through Oklahoma History
This Part examines “first principles,” both at the national and state level,
as vehicles for reinvigorating and justifying anew common-law property
concepts. Specifically, certain vestiges of feudal property law may find new
life in the idiosyncratic history of Oklahoma. Admitted to statehood in
1907,185 Oklahoma wrestled with cultural and ideological tensions from the
late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries. 186 From these tensions
emerged unique conceptions of land ownership, autonomy, and political
power—marriages between farmers burning with Christian fervor and
Socialist organizers drawing on a movement that was avowedly antireligious.187 But such alliances of strange bedfellows arose for a reason: a
yearning for the opportunity and self-actualization that was said to be the
American birthright. 188 And seemingly incongruous political relationships
drew from an ideological palette that was fundamentally American,
providing the critical, interstitial adhesion between competing viewpoints
and lifestyles. In this historical moment, with churning discourse, property
law may avoid the crush of withering criticism, instead finding its phoenixlike rebirth. 189
184. Yes, this is the second musical reference of the article—this time from Les
Misérables. See Jennifer Butt & Leo Burmester, Master of the House, on HIGHLIGHTS FROM
LES MISÉRABLES (MCA/Verve 2003).
185. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 177.
186. See JIM BISSETT, AGRARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA: MARX, JEFFERSON, AND JESUS
IN THE OKLAHOMA COUNTRYSIDE, 1904–1920, at 7 (1999).
187. See id. at 85–104.
188. See id. at 11–12.
189. Part III’s argument is admittedly a white history of Oklahoma. Engaged dialogue
about the experiences of both Native Americans and blacks in Oklahoma must be had,
particularly with regard to land ownership; unfortunately, such dialogue is beyond the scope
of this Comment. Additionally, Part III’s argument is offered as merely one option, and in
many ways, it focuses on the history of predominately white settlers because their
experiences best comport with this Comment’s overarching goal of providing alternative
grounds for justifying the common law of property. Rich and nuanced debates may be had
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The story begins with Thomas Jefferson. Beyond his political
accomplishments, Jefferson was the ideological godfather of a diffuse,
egalitarian vision of American democracy, where power was local and the
farmer was the country’s ideal citizen. 190 The semi-subsistence, republican
yeoman farmer, in Jefferson’s eyes, received strength and intellectual
emancipation through his land, which allowed him to reach “virtuous,
independent political judgments.”191 These “honest, moderately prosperous,
and productive toilers” were the country’s backbone, clear-eyed and
rational, in contrast with industrial laborers and urban workers, whose
dependence on others clouded their judgment. 192 These yeomen provided
one rationale for Jefferson’s signature domestic achievement: the Louisiana
Purchase, from which Oklahoma was carved. 193 In the Purchase, Jefferson
saw an opportunity for an eternal agrarian republic founded on the small
land holder,194 who was “the most precious part of a state.”195 In his thought
and legacy, then, Jefferson represented the dream of individual autonomy,
self-reliance, and economic opportunity, all within a landscape (ideally)
devoid of wide disparities in property ownership and the crippling
inequalities that followed such disparity. 196
Jefferson’s views on land and citizenship found their way into public
policy in postbellum (and pre-statehood) Oklahoma. Following the Civil
War, the United States government began a process of seizing lands held by
Native Americans, often to resettle tribes that had not lived in Oklahoma
prior to the post-war period. 197 However, a tract of land located in the center
of the territory, formerly held by the Creeks and Seminoles, remained
unsettled; it was these “Unassigned Lands” that became the beacon of
westward expansion for earnest settlers looking to make their own way. 198
about whether the Native American property philosophy, which was far more communal and
non-commercial, might lead to more convincing alternatives to the common law—perhaps
even alternatives decidedly against reform proposals such as those suggested by Professors
Gallanis and Barros. See generally DANNEY GOBLE, PROGRESSIVE OKLAHOMA: THE MAKING
OF A NEW KIND OF STATE 44–47 (1980).
190. See WILENTZ, supra note 2, at 47–48.
191. See id. at 47.
192. Id. at 47–48.
193. See id. at 109–12.
194. Id. at 111.
195. THOMAS JEFFERSON, II.7 To Rev. James Madison, in JEFFERSON : POLITICAL
WRITINGS 105, 107 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
196. See id.
197. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
198. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141, 147; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
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And these settlers hung their hopes immediately on an existing federal
statute: the Homestead Act.199
Signed into law by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, the Homestead Act
opened lands owned by the federal government to private settlement. 200
Citizens could file claims for up to a quarter section—160 acres of land—
which they would own outright after living on and improving their plot for
five years.201 When the federal government initially maintained that the
Unassigned Lands fell outside the Act’s purview, 202 hopes turned to
pressure, epitomized by the “Boomer” movement of the late nineteenth
century.203 The relentless Boomer “invasions” of Oklahoma—along with a
grander desire by Midwesterners for agrarian settlement and commercial
development—finally wore down the federal government’s resistance; 204 in
1889, Congress amended the Indian Appropriations Act205 to open the
Unassigned Lands for settlement.206 Pursuant to the amendment, Oklahoma
opened its doors at high noon on April 22, 1889 in the now-famous Land
Run.207
The policy of private ownership became pervasive following this initial
giveaway, and the primary targets after the first Land Run were the Indian
reservations across the territory. 208 Enabled by the Dawes Act, 209 the federal
government broke up communally-owned tribal lands and distributed them
as 160-acre allotments to individual Native Americans. 210 As tribal
populations tended to be small, this process often—and unsurprisingly—
left surplus acreage for government ownership after distribution, and this
199. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141.
200. Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (repealed 1976)); see also BAIRD &
GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
201. See Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (repealed 1976)); see also
BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. The Homestead Act
itself was inspired by Jeffersonian themes of westward expansion and poverty relief through
more egalitarian land ownership. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 1995).
202. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141–42; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
203. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 142; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
204. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 143–44; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
205. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012); BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
206. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 144–45. The amendment effectively paid off the
Creeks and Seminoles to ensure there were no unresolved claims to the land and empowered
the president to set a time for settlers to enter Oklahoma. Id. at 144.
207. See id. at 144–45; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.
208. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 145; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
209. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (repealed 2000); BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
210. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 153; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
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acreage became fertile territory for additional settlements under the
Homestead Act.211 By the turn of the century, this homesteading had
resulted in twin territories in modern-day Oklahoma: the Oklahoma
Territory, comprising the state’s central and western half, and the remaining
Indian territory, comprising the eastern lands held by the Five Civilized
Tribes. 212
Exempted from the Dawes Act, the Five Tribes maintained a unique
relationship with the federal government, which formally recognized their
tribal governments.213 But as settlers continued to flow into Oklahoma,
forces inside and outside the state pushed to open the Indian territory for
settlement. 214 This clamoring culminated in the Curtis Act,215 which offered
the Five Tribes a no-win situation: either they would dissolve their
governments and divide their lands, or the federal government would do it
for them. 216 The Five Tribes relented, proceeding to adopt the “civilized”
policy of private ownership by divvying up their communal lands among
their members.217 By the eve of statehood in 1907, Oklahoma had shed
competing land ownership arrangements in favor of the homestead ideal,
with the small landholder emerging as central to the state’s ethos.
This “yeomen” focus also pervaded one of the more unique political
movements in Oklahoma’s history—the rise (and fall) of the state’s
Socialist Party.218 The Socialist Party—always a minority movement in the
United States—arguably found its strongest iteration in turn-of-the-century
Oklahoma, reaching its acme during the 1910s. 219 The state party derived
much of its strength from its recognition of agrarian anxieties, offering hope
in the face of national neglect for non-industrial workers.220 With a
membership heavily comprised of farmers and agricultural laborers,
Oklahoma socialists aimed to realize the American Dream through a
nuanced, multifaceted indictment of commercial exploitation and class
conflict.221 Consequently, the Party fused political and cultural
crosscurrents into a unique theory tailor-made for the region, drawing
211. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 146, 153; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
212. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 163–64; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
213. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 153; see BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
214. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 155; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
215. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (repealed 2000); BAIRD & GOBBLE, supra note 3, at 156.
216. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 156; see BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
217. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 155–56; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.
218. See BISSETT, supra note 186.
219. See id. at 3.
220. See id. at xv, 5.
221. See id. at 7–8.
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heavily from three particular areas: “(1) the Jeffersonian emphasis on the
common man, the dignity of labor, and the importance of the land . . . (2)
the scathing indictment of capitalism set down by Karl Marx . . . and (3) the
evangelical Protestant tradition that had been central to the American
experience since the Great Revival of the early nineteenth century.” 222
Together, the “Marxist message of class conflict,” “Jeffersonian promise of
yeoman democracy,” and “moral authority of Christianity” proved a potent
organizational platform and ultimately infected the state’s entire political
discourse, framing the arguments made by both Republicans and Democrats
seeking office. 223
The driving force behind the Party’s success and strife was one
omnipresent object: land. 224 Low crop prices in the early twentieth century
sharply increased the ranks of tenant farmers; 225 by 1910, tenants
outnumbered landowners in Oklahoma, with the average rate of tenancy at
fifty-five percent and nearing ninety percent in certain counties. 226 This
reality was particularly odious given that Oklahomans viewed farming as an
idyllic and quintessentially American pursuit.227
Into the breach stepped the Socialist Party. Seizing upon the ideological
innovations of preceding organizations and movements,228 the Party sought
to address two central issues for skeptical small farmers: (1) whether a party
generally opposed to private property would support farmers owning their
lands and (2) whether the party’s organizational structure would reflect the
egalitarian tones of its platform. 229 Oklahoma socialists quickly realized
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 7 n.4 (“Oklahoma socialists inherited a reverence for the
Jeffersonian ideals of democracy and the importance of the yeoman farming class for the
maintenance of the American democratic tradition.”).
224. See id. at 11–12, 62.
225. See id. at 9–10.
226. See id. at 11.
227. Bissett offers the following assessment:
To this majority of Oklahoma farmers, the crisis on the land was made all the
more objectionable by the exalted position farmers were purported to occupy in
American society. All farmers, even the most impoverished tenants, had
internalized the Jeffersonian notion that yeoman farmers represented the
bedrock of American democracy. Yet the dream of yeoman democracy,
portrayed in glowing terms by countless politicians attempting to invoke
Jefferson’s memory, conflicted with the life experiences of those involved in
the labor of farming.
Id. at 11-13.
228. See id. at 22–23, 61–64 (discussing Indiahoma Farmers’ Alliance).
229. See id. at 60–62.
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that communal ownership of farmlands was neither politically nor
ideologically advantageous, developing instead a political philosophy that
addressed systemic inequalities through greater diffusion of land
ownership.230 Far from being the utopian end-goal, land collectivization
embodied the specter of tenancy for Oklahoma farmers. 231
Thus, the Socialist Party resolved the central tension between the
“Marxist demand for land collectivization [and] the Jeffersonian ideal of
autonomous yeomen farmers” by calling for wholesale ownership reform:
only by “returning the land to those who worked it” could the state’s
broader inequalities be cured.232 By 1912, the Party officially supported
redistribution of farmland to tenants in an effort to expand the ranks of
owners in Oklahoma.233 The party structure also reflected this broadening
of the “property franchise,” with calls for democratization met by
decentralized power and a more egalitarian framework to complement the
“yeomen” focus of the Party.234 While the Socialist Party of Oklahoma
declined abruptly following the First World War,235 its ideals did not die
out—indeed, they reflected the more institutional forces that had
culminated in the state’s constitution just a few years earlier.236
Conclusion
What does any of this have to do with property law derived from feudal
England? In one sense, not a great deal—but in a more significant sense,
more than one might think. Law is ultimately an expression of policy
positions and competing conceptions of the societal good; it speaks in a
language that flows from the broad notions that structure and govern a
given polity. Oklahoma offers source material for these notions. Themes of
individual land ownership, egalitarianism, and hard-earned economic
opportunity abound in Oklahoma’s early social and political history. These
230. See id. at 66 (noting how an Oklahoma newspaper editor “effortlessly combined a
Marxist understanding of the agricultural crisis . . . with Jefferson’s tenet that only through
freehold tenure could a measure of equality be attained in American society”).
231. See id. at 67.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 68.
234. See id. at 82–84.
235. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 182–83.
236. Oklahoma’s constitution was looked at as the ideal of the American Progressive
movement. Specifically, the constitution struck out against monopolization, and it eliminated
restrictions on land such as primogeniture, entailments, and multigenerational encumbrances
on title. See GOBLE, supra note 189, at 214-18.
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themes, when juxtaposed against prevailing property law, offer a new
rationale for doctrines and classifications lambasted as useless and archaic.
Compare this notion to modern proposals for property law reform.
Contemporary reforms aim to make the system more efficient, simpler, and
clearer. Moreover, the reforms operate on the idea that the grantor’s intent
is the North Star for construing deeds, with society’s general preference for
free alienability and marketability of property interests acting as important
background information for this intent.
Yet the reforms seem to culminate in disparate results. Abrogating the
destructibility doctrine, for instance, may promote land alienability—it
increases the likelihood real property will end up in the hands of someone
other than the grantor—but it alienates at the cost of the grantor’s intent,
which is the paramount factor in land transactions. Conversely, chipping
away at the Rule Against Perpetuities empowers the grantor to tie up her
land for multiple generations—but this of course leaves less land for
market, stunting alienability in the long term. Further, ever-simpler menus
of future interests mean the grantor is left with fewer options by which to
divide her land, even though such division—temporally, conceptually,
physically—is a hallmark of the Anglo-American system of law. Thus,
even if things like intent and alienability should guide legal policymaking,
it is not at all clear that the reforms up for consideration today actually
accomplish these goals.
Feudal doctrines recast in light of regional “first principles,” like those of
Oklahoma, however, may serve as potential agents for the two central goals
of modern property law—effectuating the intent of the grantor and
promoting the alienability of land. While scholars castigate the
destructibility doctrine as an unjustified handmaiden of the outmoded
“abeyance in seisin,” Oklahomans may find use in this doctrine as a tool
both for empowering the landholder who reigns supreme in the state’s
mythology and ensuring that the state’s policy favoring alienation remains
rooted in the notion that the “grantor as owner” is the fundamental locus of
power and authority vis-à-vis real property. Likewise, the Rule Against
Perpetuities takes on new meaning as a policy statement contextualizing
land transactions in Oklahoma; drawing on its constitutional foundations,
the Rule announces an overarching societal judgment against the dead hand
of the past and long-range encumbrances on title. And rather than an echo
from England’s feudal past, the Rule may now be viewed as an outgrowth
of the state’s rugged individualism, its belief that man ought to be selfmade and wealth ought to flow freely among citizens instead of
accumulating over time in fewer and fewer hands. Even the classificatory
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scheme of present estates, the allegedly tedious and meaningless
distinctions between the power of termination and the possibility of
reverter, might survive unscathed, its complexity now acknowledged as a
rich heterogeneity that offers the landowner a panoply of options by which
she may interact with her property. Run the steady standbys of property law
through this new, state-specific framework and see what sticks—the old
“relics” of feudalism may find new life yet on the American frontier.
Gerard Michael D’Emilio
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